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Democracy 
 
In 1997 James Bohman trumpeted the ‘The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy’ 
and certainly over the last fifteen years, deliberative democracy has become an 
increasingly dominant strand of democratic theory. It has begun to dominate the 
literature from enthusiasts and critics and has developed into a mature and complex 
theory with a diversity of strands and tendencies, gaining popularity and credence as a 
critique of existing democracy, as a normative force and as an ideal to be approximated. 
The principle aim of the chapter is to highlight this diversity brought about by an ever-
increasing collection of strands that are becoming ever more disparate (Saward, 2000a: 
5). These strands and tendencies are not entirely exclusive as key features are shared 
and many crossovers can be identified, making deliberative theory deep, complex and 
muddled. Hopefully, the chapter will clearly set out the lines of conflict and agreement. 
  
A secondary aim is to demonstrate the relevance of deliberative theory to key 
problems faced by democratic theory in general. The theory itself retains many classical 
elements of democracy as in many respects it reinvents a participatory model of 
democracy derived from Athenian Democracy (Dryzek, 2000: 2). Inspiration is taken 
from some of the most influential democratic theorists over the ages such as Aristotle, 
John Stuart Mill, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey and Hannah Arendt. Therefore, 
as well as being one of the most provocative and contentious contemporary democratic 
theories, it provides a great insight into many of the classic, perennial and contemporary 
issues most pertinent in democratic theory.   
 
Both aims will be achieved by considering six broad questions essential to 
gaining an understanding of deliberative democracy. These are: 
1. What is deliberative democracy? 
2. What is so good about deliberative democracy? 
3. What is the nature of public reason? 
4. Is deliberative democracy a model of democracy? 
5. Can deliberative democracy enhance political equality? 
6. Can deliberative democracy be institutionalised? 
 
1. Defining Deliberative Democracy 
 
Although democracy essentially means ‘rule by the people’, it has always been a 
contested concept and interpreted in many different ways through its long history. In 
essence, the theory of deliberative democracy is making a statement on the ‘true’ 
meaning of democracy in the modern age and in particular, provides a critique of the 
dominant conception of democracy found in modern liberal democracies. 
 
As its title suggests there are two key elements; ‘democracy’ and ‘deliberation.’ 
The democratic part is collective decision-making through the participation of all 
relevant actors. The deliberative strand is the making of the decisions through the give-
and-take of rational arguments (Elster, 1998: 8).  The ideal of deliberative democracy is 
best represented in Jürgen Habermas’ counterfactual procedures termed ‘the ideal 
speech situation’ (ISS).  Here communication is undistorted, as all participants are free 
and equal with no power discrepancies and unconstrained from subjection, self-delusion 
and strategic activity.  All views are aired in an unlimited discourse, creating open 
participation aimed at rational consensus (Habermas, 1990: 56-58), where the ‘unforced 
force of the better argument’ is decisive (Habermas, 1996a). 
 
The deliberative strand can be described as; ‘a dialogical process of exchanging 
reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that cannot be settled 
without interpersonal co-ordination and co-operation’ (Bohman, 1996: 27). Through 
deliberative interaction and communication and therefore the consideration of those 
with differing preferences, existing preferences can be transformed and new preferences 
formed. Jon Elster sums up preference transformation as the defining mark of 
deliberative democracy: ‘The transformation of preferences through rational 
deliberation is the ostensible goal of arguing’ (Elster, 1998: 6).  Therefore in order for 
deliberation to have taken place, communication between participants must induce 
‘reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion’. This deliberation is democratic if 
these reflective preferences influence collective decisions and all have had an 
opportunity to participate equally (Dryzek, 2000: 2). However, people will not only 
adapt preferences because of good reasons, as in the ISS, but also due to other factors 
such as the provider of the information and the manner in which it is provided.   
 
Nevertheless, deliberative theorists believe that preferences will adapt to reason 
and conceive preferences as being exogenous, formed during the political process rather 
than prior to it. In contrast, many other democrats and social choice theorists share the 
prevalent liberal conception, that perceives preferences as endogenous and unchanging. 
They think deliberative theorists confuse evidence of changing preferences with a 
change in the available ‘choice set’ on a particular decision (Miller, 1993: 90; Dryzek, 
2000: 32). Whether preferences are exogenous or endogenous is essentially an empirical 
question. The results from deliberative opinion polls in the USA, UK, Australia and 
Denmark indicate that preferences will change when citizens participate in democratic 
deliberation (Fishkin and Luskin, 2000: 23; Issues Deliberation Australia, 1999b; 
Andersen and Hansen, 2001).   This is certainly not conclusive empirical evidence, but 
the increasing volume of results from deliberative opinion polls and citizen juries does 
indicate that preferences are exogenous and counter empirical evidence must be 
provided to suggest differently.   
 
This broad conception of the two components of democratic deliberation is then 
accepted by most within the tradition; however there are still some key disputes that 
need to be addressed.  
 
2. Justifications of Deliberative Democracy 
 
One of the most significant divides within deliberative democracy derives from 
alternative justifications. There have always been various justifications of democracy, 
which advocate ‘basic political values’ and then illuminate how democracy promotes 
these values (Christiano, 1996: 15) and deliberative theorists are no different. Three 
prominent justifications of deliberative democracy will be outlined in turn: the 
prudential justification, the epistemic justification and the fair procedure justification. 
These justifications are often cited to justify democracy in general, but the deliberative 
theorists make the case that not any model of deliberative democracy will suffice 
because deliberative democracy can best promote these ‘basic political values.’ 
 
 
i) The prudential justification 
 
According to this justification, deliberative democracy is good because it enables ‘each 
participant to gain an equally clear and reflective understanding of his ideas and 
interests …’, (at least in comparison to purely aggregative models of democracy where 
decisions are reached without debate because citizens just choose to vote for an 
outcome). Deliberative democracy can therefore help to overcome inequalities between 
citizens with respect to information and rationality  (Festenstein, 2002: 103).   
 
  No participant can predict what all participants’ opinions would be or know all 
the information relevant to a decision (Benhabib, 1996: 71). Through debate 
participants’ preferences will be revised in light of perspectives and information of 
which they were previously unaware and that would not be present in purely 
aggregative mechanisms (Manin, 1987: 349). They also have the opportunity to 
question the information and arguments that have been put forth by partisan sources, 
and form and enter into debate with their own information and arguments in a manner 
that is persuasive to others which will further help them gain a clearer understanding of 
their own beliefs and preferences. The information provided in the discussion, from the 
various participants, may also have some direct bearing on the outcomes of the various 
choices, which could, would or should have an effect on what decision the collective 
makes.  
 
However, it seems impossible for all relevant and available information to be 
perfectly disseminated to all citizens in modern complex societies (although in the ISS 
this would be the case) because democratic deliberation can only ever increase access to 
available information. Due to the exigency of time, decisions cannot be put on hold 
until all information has been disseminated. We therefore face the dilemma of where the 
trade-off between gathering information and making the decision should be made and 
perhaps deliberation must proceed with the understanding that in the future, information 
may come to light that could change the participants’ preferences.     
 
ii) The epistemic justification 
 
In this justification, deliberative democracy is good because it is the best method of 
producing good decisions. If another model of democracy, or even an undemocratic 
method, were a more reliable method, deliberative democracy would be unnecessary 
(Estlund, 1997: 183). However, the argument is that deliberative democracy is the most 
reliable method because by generating public reason it can lead to decisions that are 
true, well justified or commensurate with justice or the common good (Bohman, 1998: 
403; Festenstein, 2002: 99). One of the key problems with this justification is how do 
we know that deliberative democracy does produce decisions that promote the common 
good? If we could test that it does then that would mean there is another method for 
identifying the common good. Moreover, it is also reliant upon there being a ‘real truth’ 
about the common good (Festenstein, 2002: 99-100). Finally, if there is continuing 
disagreement after a period of deliberation, the minority will still deny the correctness 
of the decision and therefore not feel obligated by the decision (Estlund, 1997: 175) and 
there is no incentive to compromise one’s position: ‘Participants may insist that the 
public good was quite satisfactorily expressed in their own original proposals, with 
supporting reasons, or by some other view which emerged’ (Festenstein, 2002: 100).  
 
iii) The fair procedure justification 
 
This justification is opposed to the epistemic one, claiming there is no external good by 
which to judge decisions. Rather, the resulting decisions in deliberative democracy will 
be ‘just’ because they are derived from the fair procedures in which all have been able 
to participate equally, regardless of what the actual decision is (Cohen, 1989). It is 
evident that all get to participate equally in a vote, so the proceduralists must make the 
further claim that public reason increases the fairness of the procedure by encouraging 
participants to consider the preferences of others and improves ‘the quality of 
preferences, opinions and reasons’. This then takes the proceduralists towards either the 
prudentialist or epistemic approach and is also a peculiar use of the term ‘fair’ because 
fairness is usually equated with impartiality (Festenstein, 2002:  102-103). This 
justification also fails to account for why the decisions that result from the ideal 
procedures of deliberative democracy are ‘correct’ and based upon ‘good’ or 
‘compelling’ reasons (Estlund, 1997: 197). Without good reasons why should the 
decision that has been produced by deliberatively democratic procedures be selected 
over any of the other available options? It would be just as fair to select an option 
randomly by a coin toss or through a vote (Estlund, 1997: 178; Festenstein, 2002: 103).  
 
3. The Nature of Public Reason 
 
Reasons are the currency of deliberative democracy, and public reason has always 
played a central but contested role in debates about democracy. A survey of the current 
debates on the nature and role of public reason in deliberative democracy illuminates 
the key areas of contestation on the concept. These are central to many models of 
democracy as well as further demonstrating the various tendencies that are developing 
in deliberative democracy itself. Three main questions will be considered. Can public 
reason be produced privately or only collectively? Whether the reasons offered need to 
be compelling to all to be public? Is a consensus likely and desirable? 
 
i) Collective or private deliberation? 
 
Democratic deliberation is generally considered to be a joint, collective activity yet 
following in the Rawlsian tradition, both Robert Goodin and Adolf Gundersen envisage 
democratic deliberation as being desirable and possible outside of collective debate. 
John Rawls and his followers favour individual deliberation, which is structurally 
different as it contains no dialogue, no give-and-take of reasons, and no influence 
between actors (Rawls, 1993: 227). 
 
Goodin suggests deliberative democracy can be a solo affair, providing others 
are made ‘imaginatively present’ through individuals conducting ‘a wide ranging debate 
within their heads.’ Nevertheless, he accepts collective deliberation will still be 
necessary as we can never know the views of others; so some will be misportrayed, 
others completely ignored and few put as persuasively as they would be by the agent 
themselves  (Goodin, 2003:  63-64).  
 
Gundersen advocates ‘dyadic’ deliberation in his ‘Socratic model’. Groups 
could still assemble to make collective decisions, but communication between them 
would always be dyadic with ‘serial one-to-one encounters’ (Gundersen, 2000: 98).  
According to Gundersen, the first advantage of dyadic deliberation over collective 
deliberation is that it is easier to institutionalise  (Gundersen, 2000: 98). This may be the 
case, but unless it can generate the same or preferable normative consequences, it only 
stands if deliberative democracy is impossible to institutionalise otherwise collective 
deliberation should be pursued. However, Gundersen does claim dyadic deliberation is 
normatively superior to the collective alternative. He suggests that the relationship 
between participants is more interactive and therefore ‘allows each partner to more 
easily ascertain the other’s knowledge and interests’, making clarification much easier 
because in a group it would mean the monopolisation of debate between two people 
(Gundersen, 2000: 98-100).  This seems uncertain because there may be more than one 
misunderstanding, sharing similarities with others.  A debate about clarification could 
therefore take place between more than two participants and aid the understanding of 
many participants.  Furthermore, Gundersen suggests that dyadic communication will 
mean greater equality between participants than in collective deliberation because 
power in dyadic relationships is easier to challenge verbally and exit is also easier 
(Gundersen, 2000: 101).  This claim may be true in some cases, but certainly not in all.  
There are certain dyadic relationships where it is harder to challenge power verbally and 
exit is even harder than in collective debate; it seems to depend upon context.  For 
example a dyadic relationship may be dominated by one of the participants, if the other 
holds them in high esteem or with excessive respect, for whatever reason.  This of 
course can occur in collective deliberation, but others would be present and would 
hopefully challenge the ‘esteemed figure’ with reasons.  Two people may find it very 
hard to respect deliberative procedures because of the disrespect they feel towards each 
other, but these feelings may be calmed by the presence of other participants debating. 
The main problem is that dyadic deliberation cannot generate public reason in the same 
manner as collective deliberation.  
 
Here we see the quasi-Marxist element in the theory of deliberative democracy. 
Elster, in ‘The Market and the Forum’ (1997), suggests that pure aggregation of 
preferences (and the argument could be applied to private deliberation) confuses the 
type of behaviour that is apt in the market place and the forum.  In the market the 
consumer can be sovereign because the different choices will only affect the consumer.  
This is not the case when making collective political decisions, as many of the citizens’ 
preferences may be defective (Elster, 1997: 10) and need to be justified to the rest of the 
polity because the agents are not just deciding for themselves (Brennan and Lomasky, 
1993: 33-34). If private, this deliberation does not open people up to the arguments of 
others, or force people to defend their choice. 
 
The differences between collective and private deliberative theorists derive from 
different views on the nature of public reason. To be ‘public’ (for both groups) the 
reasons offered must be understandable and acceptable to all citizens or at least 
potentially so (Bohman, 1997: 26). However, the private deliberationists see reason as 
‘singular’, meaning that all will reason in the same way, negating the need for others to 
be present (Rawls, 1993: 227; for a critique see Benhabib, 1996: 75 and Dryzek, 2000: 
15). Therefore, individual citizens must consciously adopt public reason, rather than it 
being generated by the presence of others (Rawls, 1997: 15; for a critique see Dryzek, 
2000: 15). In contrast, for the collective deliberationists, it is the very presence of other 
citizens that will encourage people to think ‘publicly’, the idea being that selfish reasons 
of the type ‘I agree with this because it will really benefit me, but disadvantage others’ 
will be unconvincing to others. Collective deliberation will therefore encourage people 
to focus on public values if their arguments are to persuade people of the validity of 
their ideas (Elster, 1997: 12; Miller, 1993: 82; Benhabib, 1996: 72). Included in the 
process of collective deliberation will be those who would be disadvantaged from these 
selfish preferences, and so could not possibly justify their prejudices to these people. 
 
ii) Universal or specific reasons? 
 
Collective deliberation then seems to have greater normative potential than private 
deliberation. However, it still does not guarantee the generation of public reason as 
defined. Rather than offering reasons that are convincing to all, people may offer 
reasons that are aimed at a majority, or the largest minority. (This is of course 
dependent upon there being an established majority that is apparent to the participants 
and as preferences will change during deliberatively democratic debate, this majority 
may change during the process).  One suggested solution is that deliberative democracy 
should lead to a result ‘that enjoys the widest possible support’, not just majority 
support (Miller, 2000: 152).  Perhaps finding reasons that all can accept is too stringent 
a demand, given the fact of pluralism.   
 
Furthermore, it cannot be expected that the same reasons will convince all 
citizens of a certain decision. Psychological research has indicated that reflective 
preference transformation will be limited because people are unresponsive to reasons 
that do not support their preconceptions of an issue. This might explain why different 
people will look at the same piece of evidence and use it to support their own distinct 
interests (Femia, 1996: 378-81). Therefore ‘the force of an argument is always relative’  
(Manin, 1987: 353; Dahl, 1994, p. 31) and if rational arguments are to persuade an 
agent of a new belief, it must start by appealing to their present beliefs (Christiano, 
1997: 260). Consequently, participants in debate will offer different reasons to persuade 
different citizens of the need for the same outcome and therefore will not be public in 
the way envisioned by some deliberative theorists (Gaus, 1997). 
 
iii) The Possibility of Consensus 
 
Due to the potential of deliberative democracy to generate public reason with 
participants trying to find reasons that are convincing to all, Joshua Cohen in 
‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’ and Habermas believe that a consensus 
would eventually be achieved (Cohen, 1989: 23; Habermas, 1996a: 17-19). They 
suggest that public reason would mean people taking on board a common interest over 
their private or selfish interests as arguments must be based on the reasons that a 
proposal will be good for all and will encourage people to identify with each other and 
the collective as a whole (Cohen, 1989). 
 
However, a key democratic requirement of the ideal of deliberative democracy is 
that all should be included in the debate. More participants often leads to more opinions, 
making agreement harder to achieve, especially if some of these are previously unheard 
(Knight and Johnson, 1994: 289).  Debate can also increase disagreement as well as 
reduce it. A collective could easily have a general agreement on some issue, but a 
debate could generate a greater diversity of opinions on an issue as it is explored more 
extensively and deeply (Fearon, 1998: 57; Knight and Johnson, 1994: 286; Christiano, 
1997:  249; Weale, 2000: 2; Mansbridge, 1980: 65; Budge, 2000: 203). It is further 
suggested that there are a ‘plurality of ultimate values.’ People believe in totally 
different ideas of ‘the good life’ and are therefore too different, making agreement on 
ultimate values impossible.  In modern cosmopolitan societies there are people from 
very different cultures who are unlikely to reach a consensus (Christiano, 1997: 249; 
Weale, 2000: 2). It seems unlikely that consensus will be achieved, which Cohen and 
Habermas do accept (Cohen, 1998: 197; Habermas, 1996a: 304-305 & 1996b: 18), but 
both still maintain that consensus should still remain the ‘ideal guiding discussion’  
(Miller, 1993: 81; Bohman, 1996: 35-36).   
 
The agonistic branch of deliberative democracy is not concerned by differences 
persisting, but rather praises differences as an essential resource for democratic 
deliberation, without which the deliberative process would be redundant (Young, 
1996:127). Agonistics reject the idea that consensus on the common good is the sole 
aim of deliberation; they fear that the ‘common good’ might not be common at all, but 
simply a perpetuation of inequality and that consensus might be achieved due to 
acquiescence to power rather than being rationally motivated (Mansbridge, 1980: 32; 
Gambetta, 1998: 21; Gould, 1988: 18; Young, 1996:126). It is suggested that dominant 
social and economic groups are at an advantage because they can put forward their 
preferences and opinions as ‘authoritative knowledge’ and their interests as neutral and 
in the process devalue those with alternative beliefs, preferences and interests (Young, 
1997: 399). 
 
It seems then that consensus is not possible and perhaps not desirable. If this is 
the case, it is apparent that in order for decisions to be made deliberation can only ever 
support the aggregation of preferences and not replace it altogether (Dryzek, 2000: 38; 
Przeworski, 1998: 142; Johnson, 1998: 177). This means that the deliberative ideal of 
democracy loses some of its critical edge against aggregative models of democracy, 
which further raises the question of whether deliberative democracy can be considered a 
model of democracy. 
 
4. The Deliberative Model of Democracy 
 
For some, if deliberative democracy cannot reach a consensus and voting is still 
required to make a decision, this is evidence that it is not distinct and separate from 
aggregative models (Saward, 2000b: 67-68; see also Squires, 2002: 133-134).1 Whether 
this argument is accepted depends upon how one defines a ‘model of democracy.’ C.B. 
Macpherson suggests that a ‘model’ should explain structural relations and have a 
normative element, which offers a ‘model of man’ and an ‘ethically justificatory theory’  
(Macpherson, 1977: 2-6). With regard to explaining structural relations, public reason is 
absent in a purely aggregative model and consequently, a deliberative model would 
produce differing structural relations and requires different forms of participation due to 
the differences between public and private deliberation outlined above. With respect to 
having a distinctive explanatory or normative approach, a purely aggregative model 
views the source of legitimacy as citizens’ predetermined preferences and a deliberative 
model sees the formation of these preferences as the source of legitimacy, which 
therefore leads to differing normative and empirical claims.   
 
Furthermore, deliberation and aggregation are not elements present in all 
conceptions of democracy; Habermas (1996b) has suggested in the past that collective 
deliberation could lead to consensus and William Riker (1982: 5) and Rousseau (1968) 
have perceived democratic arrangements purely dependent on voting without any 
collective deliberation. Consequently, a purely aggregative model of democracy is not a 
mythical construct set up as a straw man by deliberative democrats.  It is true that liberal 
democracies do not presently approximate the aggregative model of democracy as 
collective deliberation does occur in certain circumstances, through the media for 
example. Nevertheless, this does not mean the aggregative model does not exist as a 
theoretical construct.  Neither does it rule out the deliberative model being a model, 
because as Macpherson realised new models develop as a critique of previous models, 
and are suggested as a ‘corrective’ or ‘replacement’.  However, this critique only need 
to be upon part of the preceding model and can therefore embody ‘substantial elements 
of an earlier’ model (Macpherson, 1977: 8). Therefore, it seems that despite some form 
of deliberation and voting existing in many conceptions of democracy, it still can be 
useful, meaningful and enlightening to highlight the empirical and normative 
differences between these models in relation to democratic forms and structural 
relations. 
 
5. Political Equality in Deliberative Democracy 
 
The normative claims made by deliberative democrats have been challenged by those 
concerned with its ability to achieve political equality because it relies upon forms of 
communication that privilege those already dominant, resulting in their gaining unequal 
influence in the deliberative settings that is not derived from the ‘force of the better 
argument’ and therefore reinforces rather than reduces political inequality. Specifically, 
the capabilities required to participate effectively in democratic deliberation are not 
neutral. For example the language required, the formality of the debate and the 
rationalism will favour dominant social groups like white middle-class men (Young, 
1996:123-25), who are also likely to speak more in discussion and gain undue influence 
not based upon the quality of their reasons (Sanders, 1997: 365-366). ‘Insidious 
prejudices’ are also highlighted as a reason why the arguments of minority social groups 
will not be ‘heard’ and that these prejudices will go unnoticed and therefore will not be 
countered by reasons offered in deliberation (Sanders, 1997: 353).   
 
Instead of deliberative democracy, Iris Marion Young in ‘Communication and 
the Other’ (1996), advocates ‘communicative democracy’, which she suggests will 
differ from deliberative democracy by favouring greeting, rhetoric and storytelling over 
rational argument.  She argues that this will make communication more compatible with 
pluralism because they are more amenable to the particularity of participants. ‘Greeting’ 
deals with how participants provide recognition amongst each other and is said to be 
important as it creates the right atmosphere for deliberation and can indicate a mutual 
respect.  ‘Rhetoric’ is the use of cultural symbols and values, which can provoke and 
motivate participants, playing a key role in getting issues on the agenda.  ‘Storytelling’ 
or ‘testimony’ is the use of narratives personal or otherwise and claimed to be essential, 
as people need to share their personal experiences to highlight and demonstrate their 
specific position. 
 
Many deliberative democrats have accepted that greeting, rhetoric and 
storytelling could and should play a part in deliberation, but have further responded by 
highlighting the fact that these communicative aspects are as hierarchical as the rational 
deliberation criticised.  Just as some people are better at forming, expressing and 
understanding rational argument than others, some people will have more talent for 
greeting, rhetoric and storytelling.  Moreover, the people who have talents for these 
things may be those from the same dominant social groups who are talented arguers 
(Benhabib, 1996: 82; Dryzek, 2000: 67; Miller, 2000: 156-157; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996: 137). 
 
6. Institutionalising Deliberative Democracy  
 
One of the most pertinent critiques levelled against deliberative democracy and most 
forms of direct or participatory democracy, is that it is an irrelevant, utopian theory and 
a counterfactual ideal because it is unachievable in modern complex societies (Zolo, 
1992; Femia, 1996; Miller, 2000: 143; Benhabib, 1996: 84). The first obstacle of 
complexity is that modern societies are very plural, making deliberative democracy 
unlikely, as it decreases the chance of reaching consensus on a common good, due to 
‘intractable conflicts’. 2 The second aspect is that modern societies are too big and 
involve too many people to make democratic deliberation possible with its reliance on 
discussion (Bohman, 1996: 2). To have all citizens deliberate together seems to be an 
empirical impossibility.3  These factors are intensified by the third aspect of complexity, 
the need for technical or professional expertise, because modern decisions are also 
thought to require high demands of expertise and present trends of increasing division 
of labour and new technologies has meant citizens are incapable of participating directly 
in making decisions (Bohman, 1996: 151-152; Femia, 1996: 362).  The fourth and final 
aspect of complexity is the inequality of deliberative skills in society. A deliberative 
democracy could therefore effectively lead to rule by elites  (Bohman, 1996: 3). These 
are significant obstacles for the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy: 
 
 The facts of complexity seem to present deliberative democracy with a Weberian dilemma: either 
decision-making institutions gain effectiveness at the cost of democratic deliberation or they retain 
democracy at the cost of effective decision-making.  In either case, citizenship, deliberation, and decision-
making fail to be linked together (Bohman, 1996: 178). 
 
Nevertheless, many deliberative theorists believe that these problems can be overcome, 
providing there is an appropriate institutional design and a myriad of mechanisms have 
been advocated, again illustrating the diversity of deliberative democracy. These include 
constitutional issues, political parties, citizen juries, deliberative opinion polls and civil 
society. For Bohman it is these considerations of feasibility and institutionalisation now 
present in deliberative democracy that demonstrates that it has matured and ‘“come of 
age” as a practical ideal’ (Bohman, 1997: 422). 
 
i)  Constitutional Issues 
 
Many deliberative theorists believe that deliberative democracy should only be 
employed when forming the constitution, suggesting this would lead to a constitution 
that all could accept (Rawls, 1993:137). However, this would mean that deliberative 
democracy would not be employed for specific decisions, which is a huge step away 
from the deliberative ideal. Others see the constitution as a useful tool to ensure 
decisions are made deliberatively. In the context of the USA, Joseph Bessette, argues 
that the American Constitution ensures Congress’ decisions are commensurate with 
public reasons (Bessette 1994). This means decisions are made by elites and therefore 
excludes many from participating in deliberation and ‘ties deliberation to a needlessly 
thin conception of democracy’ (Dryzek, 2000: 3) and therefore fails to approximate the 
deliberative ideal closely. 
 
 
ii) Political Parties 
 
The fulcrum of modern democracy, political parties, has been seen as the 
appropriate location because they are essential to setting the agenda for debate. 
Realistic democratic deliberation requires a reduction of possibilities to be discussed 
and parties do this effectively by raising well-defined issues for debate (Manin, 
1987: 357; Budge, 2000: 198). They also focus on the common good, therefore 
escaping the narrow, local, sectional and issue-specific interests that deliberative 
democracy is attempting to eliminate (Cohen, 1989: 31). This requires the 
democratisation of political parties around the norms of deliberation (Manin, 1987: 
357), something that has long been considered impossible due to the inevitability of 
hierarchy (Michels, 1959).  There is also the problem that in general elections, 
parties would be granted power by citizens who may not have good reasons to 
support their vote as it would be based on pre-political preferences that had not ‘run 
the gauntlet’ of ‘genuine’ democratic deliberation (Barber, 1984, p. 136; Dryzek, 
1990: 37; Bohman, 1996: 187-8).   
 
iii) Representation by lot 
 
A rejuvenation of the Athenian method of representation by lot is the focus for those 
advocating deliberative opinion polls and citizen juries. They can both be seen as 
mechanisms to strike a balance between the competing choice of rule by deliberative 
elites or non-deliberative masses. A random sample of the population is selected to 
achieve a ‘deliberative microcosm’ of the population, with each citizen having an equal 
chance of being selected. The sample then discusses a key issue for several days, as well 
as cross-examining ‘experts’ (Fishkin and Luskin, 2000:18-20).  In citizen juries the 
number assembled is ten to twenty while in deliberative opinion polls it is a more 
representative several hundred. The concern for citizen juries is a lack of a genuinely 
representative sample, meaning that another jury with a different sample could produce 
an entirely different decision (Fishkin and Luskin, 2000: 20-1). For deliberative opinion 
polls the problems are ensuring small minorities are not excluded (Smith, 2000:31) and 
mediating debate between much bigger groups. A significant problem for both 
institutional mechanisms is that the preferences of the rest of the population will still be 
pre-deliberative as they have not participated in the debate and the likelihood is that 
they will not accept the resulting decisions. This is perhaps partially overcome through 
extensive and varied media coverage of the meetings (Fishkin and Luskin, 2000: 21; 
Smith, 2000:33); however, they still have been excluded from putting forward their own 
arguments and ‘their representatives’ are not open to recourse. The organisers or 
facilitators also have excessive control, which could lead to manipulation of the 
deliberative process as they get to set the agenda by selecting the issues for debate and 
by selecting the experts to provide information (Smith, 200: 33). Finally, in citizen 
juries the result is recommendations for decisions and the deliberative opinion poll, is as 
exactly as the title suggests, an aggregation of post deliberative preferences with no 
collective decision reached.  
 
 
iv) Civil Society 
 
The final method of institutionalisation to be considered is probably the most radical, 
and envisions citizens participating in collective deliberation through membership of 
voluntary associations and social movements in civil society. These organisations 
communicate between each other forming public spheres; ‘the space in which citizens 
deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena of discursive 
interaction’ (Fraser, 1992: 110).  This deliberation can potentially influence the opinions 
of other organisations and the state, and help set the agenda for legislation. However, 
communication in the public sphere can often deviate considerably from the deliberative 
ideal due to inequalities of resources between voluntary associations such as money and 
number and type of members (Habermas, 1996a: 363-364; Warren, 2001: 212), which 
can mean complete marginalisation for some associations (Fraser, 1992: 120). 
Moreover, decisions are still being made separately from where the deliberation is 
occurring: ‘Unless a direct link can be established and maintained between informal 
deliberation and formal decision-making the decisions made cannot realistically benefit 
from the legitimacy generated by the deliberation alone’ (Squires, 2002: 142). 
   
To overcome this problem Habermas advocates ‘two tracks’ of deliberative 
decision-making, the first in the informal arenas of the public sphere and the second in 
formal institutions (Habermas, 1996a: chapter 8).  Parliament would still remain the 
central focus for decision-making, but would make decisions in accordance with the 
norms of democratic deliberation and be supported by decentred deliberation in the 
public sphere.  The problem remains that participants in the public sphere will have 
influence in deliberation but no power to decide, which would still be the privilege of 
elites located at the centre (Bohman, 1996: 179).   
 
Following the recent rejuvenation of associational democracy (Hirst, 1994; 
Cohen and Rogers 1995), decentralisation of powers to voluntary associations to fulfil 
various functions, has been advocated (Warren, 2001; Perczynski 2000; Elstub, 2004). 
The associations can then make their own decisions, but this requires them to be 
internally deliberatively democratic. Currently they are hierarchical, with little 
participation from their members in their decisions. It also requires citizens to devote a 
lot of time to politics, which they may not be inclined to do and can exclude citizens 
affected by the decisions who are not members of the association. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Starting from a broad agreement that democracy requires participation in debate 
because preferences are exogenous and must be justified to others, the theory of 
deliberative democracy becomes riddled with dispute about nearly all its other elements. 
It is divided over the appropriate justification from the prudentialists, epistemics and 
proceduralists, which all have some difficulties. Despite disagreement persisting it was 
suggested deliberation should be collective rather than dyadic or solo if the full benefits 
of public reason are to be enjoyed. There is further discord over whether public reasons 
should be universal, appealing to all, but it was concluded that inevitably reasons would 
be context and agent specific. Likewise consensus was accepted by most to be 
unachievable, especially in plural societies, but agonistics further rejected its 
desirability. Further dissension came from communicative democrats who contested the 
content of deliberation itself. They appreciated that a sole focus on reason could 
disadvantage certain participants, but failed to recognise the same failings in their own 
recommendations. Finally, there are extensive disagreements over whether deliberative 
democracy can be institutionalised, and a variety of methods were considered, each with 
their own advantages and disadvantages and some much closer to the ideal of 
deliberative democracy than others.  
 
It is perhaps because deliberative democracy has developed this breadth and 
depth that it has come to dominate discussions on democracy and because it addresses 
recurring questions that have confronted democracy over time, such as the meaning, 
most appropriate justification and most suitable institutional design. It is possibly 
greater attention to this last aspect that has increased the theory’s credibility and this 
still remains its most significant challenge. This though is still just one of the many 
problems facing the theory of deliberative democracy, and disagreement within the 
theory will persist, but long may the debate continue. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Saward has further suggested that deliberative democrats have ‘overdrawn’ the distinction between 
deliberative and aggregative models of democracy, because citizens can deliberate in private prior to 
voting (Saward, 2000b, p. 68). Hopefully the discussion above has demonstrated the vital differences 
between private and collective deliberation. 
2 This does not affect the agonistic strand of deliberative democracy, as it does not aim to achieve 
consensus. 
3 As discussed earlier, Gundersen (2000: 98) favours a dyadic approach to democratic deliberation, and 
one of the reasons for this is that it is more realistic than collective deliberation because it is easier to 
institutionalise because of the problems of size.  However, it was argued earlier that Gundersen’s dyadic 
model misconceives the ideal of democratic deliberation due to its interpretation of public reason and 
consequently, has a lack of normative value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
  
 
Questions for Discussion 
 
 Which of the three justifications considered provides the best grounding for a theory 
of deliberative democracy? 
 Is the theory of deliberative democracy too utopian or can it be institutionalised in a 
meaningful way? 
 What type of representation would be most compatible with the norms of 
deliberative democracy? 
 Would deliberative democracy reduce or increase political equality? 
 
